Abstract-The multi-user controlled bidirectional quantum secure direct communication network protocol based on classical EXCLUSIVE-OR operation and quantum entanglement is analyzed. It is shown that this protocol has the information leakage problem, that is, one half of the information the users transmit is leaked out unconsciously. Furthermore, it is also weak against the intercept-measure-resend attack and the ControlledNot operation attack from an outside adversary, and the different initial state attack from the controller.
In this protocol, four users can exchange their secret messages two by two under the permission of a controller. The quantum channel is only used for sharing the qubits, and no encoded photons are transmitted via the quantum channel, which decreases the economic cost of communication and the effect of channel noise on the secret messages. Besides, this protocol works with single-photon measurement which is easier to implement than other measurements. The authors also claimed that this protocol is unconditionally secure and has higher efficiency than previously proposed protocols. However, if it is considered carefully, there are security problems in this protocol. To be specific, the information leakage problem exists in this protocol. It is also fragile against the intercept-measure-resend attack [24] , [25] and the ControlledNot (CNOT) operation attack [25] by an outside adversary. In addition, the controller can make an effective attack, the so-called different initial state attack [26] , to gain all the messages the users transmitted. In the following, we will explain the reasons in detail.
II. THE ORIGINAL CBQSDC NETWORK PROTOCOL
First we review the original CBQSDC protocol. There are four users, Alice1, Alice2, Bob1 and Bob2, and a controller Charlie who is also the reference node. The original CBQSDC network protocol is described as follows.
Step 1: Alice1 and Bob1 build a connection, and Alice2 and Bob2 build another connection as well with Charlie being the common controller. Charlie creates 2N +δ numbers of ordered four-qubit cluster states, in which the i -th state is
where the subscripts a, b, c and d indicate four correlated photons of the cluster state. Then Charlie randomly selects 2N numbers of these cluster states as information carriers and he randomly performs the unitary operations I = |0 0| + |1 1| or X = |0 1| + |1 0| on the first and the second photons of these cluster states. The remaining δ numbers of cluster states will be used as the sample.
Step 2: Charlie sorts all the particles a, b, c and d to form the A-sequence, the B-sequence, the C-sequence and the D-sequence, and sends them to Alice1, Alice2, Bob1 and Bob2, respectively.
Step 3: Charlie announces the positions of the sample photons in each divided sequence. Meanwhile, he randomly selects one of the two measurement bases, the B Z basis
and tells the users to apply the same bases to measure the sample photons. Then all the users compare their results to analyze the error rate. If it is greater than the threshold, the communication will stop. Otherwise, it will continue.
Step 4: After dropping the sample photons that are used for eavesdropping check in each divided sequence, each user makes N numbers of two-photon groups. For example, (a 2n−1 , a 2n ), (b 2n−1 , b 2n ), (c 2n−1 , c 2n ) and (d 2n−1 , d 2n ) are the n-th two-photon group of Alice1, Alice2, Bob1 and Bob2.
Step 5: All users measure their photons in the B Z basis and save the results. Then they use classical XOR operations to encode their secret messages with these results. That is, having taken two bits of the saved measurement results as the first inputs and two bits of the secret message as the second inputs, each user applies XOR operations. After that, they publish their XOR results through a classical channel.
Step 6: Charlie announces the unitary operations that he has performed on the first and the second photons of the information-carrier cluster states in Step 1. That is, if he performs I I, I X, X I, X X, he will publish "00", "01", "10", "11", respectively.
Step 7: Each user obtains the counterparty's secret message. Since each user has three kinds of bits: The published bits of Charlie, the published bits of his/her counterparty and the bits which have been obtained in Step 5 as the saved measurement results of the photons. For decoding the messages, each user applies the classical XOR operations on all these bits, bit by bit. For example, if Charlie publishes the bits "01", Alice1 publishes the bits "11" and Bob1 obtains the bits "10" by measuring the photons, the final results will be "00" (01⊕11⊕10 = 00). Thus Bob1 gets Alice1's secret bits "00".
III. INFORMATION LEAKAGE PROBLEM
At first glance, eight bits of classical information in all are exchanged at the cost of two four-qubit cluster states. However, if it is considered carefully, one can find that one half of the information is leaked out unconsciously. In the following, we give an example to explain the reason. Without loss of generality, we take the first two cluster states , respectively. After that, the whole state of these two four-qubit cluster states can be expressed as
In
Step 5, all the users should measure his/her two qubits in the
According to the above equation, we know that the following relationships hold.
Then they will publish two classical bits 
However, if considering carefully, we can find that anyone can get some information about the secret messages from the public information that all the users and Charlie announce. It is obvious that everyone knows that (
That is to say, one half of the secret messages have been leaked out. This is not allowed in a truly secure quantum communication protocol.
IV. THE INTERCEPT-MEASURE-RESEND ATTACK AND THE
CNOT OPERATION ATTACK BY AN OUTSIDE ADVERSARY Indeed, one of the two bases, the B Z basis and the B X basis, is randomly used to measure the four-qubit sample cluster states. The method is usually effective because these two bases are conjugated. However, it is useless against the interceptmeasure-resend attack by an outside adversary. In the following, we explain the reason. Assume Eve is the outside adversary who will make the intercept-measure-resend attack. After Charlie sends the four sequences, the A-sequence, the B-sequence, the C-sequence and the D-sequence out, Eve catches the A-sequence and the B-sequence (or the C-sequence and D-sequence ), measures each sequence with the B Z basis photon by photon, and then prepares a new fake sequence according to the results. Then Eve sends these two fake sequences to Alice1 and Alice2 (or Bob1 and Bob2) respectively. Obviously, if a sample four-qubit cluster state is intended to be measured by the B Z basis, no error will be introduced because Eve prepares the fake sequences in the B Z basis as well according to the measurement results. One may hope that there is a positive probability to detect this kind of attack when a sample four-qubit cluster state is intended to be measured by the B X basis. However, we find that the users cannot detect the attack, even if this basis is used. In the following, we explain the reason in detail. As we know, In fact, Eve can make another attack, the so-called CNOT operation attack, to steal the secret messages without being detected. As for the CNOT attack, Eve prepares two ancilla sequences, the E-sequence and the F-sequence, in which all the states stay in |0 . After Charlie sends the four sequences, the A-sequence, the B-sequence, the C-sequence and the D-sequence out, Eve captures the A-sequence and the B-sequence (or the C-sequence and D-sequence), and makes CNOT operations on the A-sequence and the E-sequence, as well as on the B-sequence and the F-sequence (or on the C-sequence and the E-sequence, and on the D-sequence and the F-sequence) with photons from the A-sequence and the B-sequence being the control qubits (or with photons from the C-sequence and the D-sequence being the control qubits). Then Eve resends the A-sequence and the B-sequence to Alice1 and Alice2, and measures the E-sequence and the F-sequence with the B Z basis. If the i -th four-qubit cluster state is a sample, the whole state will be 
That is, Eve copies Alice1's and Alice2's measurement results on photons a 1 and b 1 by measuring the ancilla e i and f i , respectively. After Charlie publishes the information about the random unitary operations performed on this cluster state, Eve can get all the users' measurement results. As a result, Eve can gain all the secret messages without being detected.
V. THE DIFFERENT INITIAL STATE ATTACK BY THE CONTROLLER Charlie is the controller and the reference node who prepares the four-qubit cluster states, so he should be prevented from stealing some information without being detected. However, in the original CBQSDC protocol, if Charlie is dishonest, he can successfully attack the protocol and steal all the information the users want to send with the different initial state attack. The attack strategy is as follows.
The δ numbers of sample cluster states used for eavesdropping check are chosen by Charlie, so he knows which four-qubit cluster states are used as information carriers. To make an efficient attack, Charlie prepares each informationcarrier cluster state in the fake state
, where e, f are two ancilla photons which will be kept in Charlie's laboratory. Then the dishonest controller acts as an honest controller would, i.e., he performs the random unitary operations I or X on the first and the second photons of these fake states. After that, he sends all the particles a, b, c and d to Alice1, Alice2, Bob1 and Bob2 respectively, but keeps the ancillas e and f in his laboratory. For a sample state, Charlie complies with the protocol. Obviously, the dishonest Charlie's action cannot be discovered by the users because he only takes actions on what are information carriers but he performs the same actions as an honest controller when a state is used for eavesdropping check.
To steal the messages the users intend to exchange, Charlie measures ancillas e and f in the B Z basis and saves the results. It is obvious that Charlie's measurement results of particles e and f are identical to those of the particles c and d. Since the random unitary operations on the particles a and b are determined by him, he can extract all the users' secret messages when they publish the XOR results in Step 5.
VI. CONCLUSION
In summary, the multi-user CBQSDC network protocol based on classical XOR operation and quantum entanglement is analyzed. It is shown that this protocol has the information leakage problem, that is, one half of the information the users transmit is leaked out unconsciously. Furthermore, it is also weak against the intercept-measure-resend attack and the CNOT operation attack from an outside adversary. Additionally, a dishonest controller can make the different initial state attack to obtain the users' secret messages without being detected.
